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COMMENT
PORTUONDO V. AGARD: DISTINGUISHING IMPEACHMENT
OF CREDIBILITY FROM THE ACT OF BURDENING A
DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decision in Portuondo v. Agard' is the latest
in the debate over whether a prosecutor's comments regarding a criminal
defendant's decision to exercise his rights under the self-incrimination
clause of the Fifth Amendment are a proper method of impeachment, or
an improper inference of guilt. Two opposing interpretations exist as to
how a defendant's right to remain silent can be treated by an opposing
party. The first interpretation takes an expansive view of the defendant's
right to silence, and considers any substantive reference to defendant's
exercising his immunity as an impermissible, unconstitutional burden.
The leading case supporting the expansive view of the self-incrimination
clause of the Fifth Amendment is Griffin v. California.2 The second in-
terpretation takes a narrow view of the defendant's right to silence, and
contends that once a defendant has waived his privilege by taking the
stand, his credibility is open to impeachment. The leading case support-
ing the restrictive view of the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth
Amendment is Jenkins v. Anderson.3
This Comment will show that the Supreme Court's decision in
Portuondo was correctly decided along the narrow view of interpretation
established by the Jenkins line of case law. Accordingly, Part II of this
Comment provides the background for the two opposing interpretations
of a defendant's rights under the Fifth Amendment by examining the
case law leading up to Portuondo. Part III provides the facts and proce-
dural history of Portuondo, and examines the reasoning behind the ma-
jority and dissenting opinions. Finally, Part IV analyzes the holding in
Portuondo, explaining why it is consistent with the narrow interpretation
1. 120 S. Ct. 1119 (2000).
2. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). See discussion infra Part I.A.
3. 447 U.S. 231 (1980). See discussion infra Part I.B.
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of earlier Supreme Court case law, and suggesting an evidentiary alter-
native.
I. BACKGROUND
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
individuals in criminal cases from being compelled to testify against
themselves.4 The Supreme Court made clear that a criminal defendant
has a "right to remain silent."5 However, a debate exists over whether a
defendant's decision to exercise this right is immune from later com-
ments that might infer guilt; or, whether under certain circumstances, the
decision can be properly used to impeach his credibility. This debate
developed two lines of case law.' The first line of cases follows an ex-
4. U.S. Const. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment specifically states, "nor shall [any person]
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witnesses against himself..." Id. See generally Leonard W.
Levy, Article: Origins of the Fifth Amendment and its Critics, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 821 (1997) (de-
fending on contemporary grounds his 1968 text that is still considered by most to be an exemplar of
fifth amendment constitutional law).
5. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (requiring police to advise defen-
dant of the right to remain silent); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (holding that
the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment shall be given liberal construction); Quinn v.
United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955) (holding the exercise of the Fifth Amendment right to
silence does not require use of particular words); but see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 451
(1974) (holding that statements by defendants are not excluded in all contexts).
6. The circuit courts are split between the more expansive Griffin interpretation and the
stricter Jenkins view. The First, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth circuits follow Griffin. See, e.g., Coppola
v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1564-68 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding the use of defendant's statement to
police that he was not going to confess was an unconstitutional burden on his Fifth Amendment right
when used by the prosecutor in his case in chief); Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283-86 (6th Cir.
2000) (holding that defendant's statement to police to go "talk to his lawyer" was an exercise of his
Fifth Amendment rights and the prosecutor's use of this pre-arrest silence was substantive evidence
of guilt and therefore improper); but see Seymour v. Walker, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 20170, *41-42
(6th Cir.) (limiting the Combs measure and finding permissible and not an inference of guilt a prose-
cutor's comments, in closing argument, that made reference to the defendant's self-defense theory);
Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding it was an error of constitutional
magnitude for the prosecutor to comment on defendant's pre-arrest refusal to speak with police);
United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding void under the Fifth
Amendment the prosecutor's statement that defendant had not responded to authorities questions,
and holding that is was "immaterial" whether the defendant had invoked his privilege to remain
silent). The Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh circuit courts follow Jenkins. See, e.g., United States v.
Collins, 972 F.2d 1385, 1408 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that a prosecutor's comments as to the defen-
dant's denial of certain business dealings were not improper because there existed an "equally plau-
sible" reason other than to infer guilt for defendant's not testifying); United States v. Cabrera, 201
F.3d 1243, 1250 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the prosecutor's comments during closing argument
were not improper and the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights not violated because he chose to take
the stand and testify); United States v. Oplinger, 150 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that
the prosecutor's comment, during closing argument, as to defendant's innocence did not violate the
self incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment); United States v. Riveria, 944 F.2d 1563, 1569-70
(11 th Cir. 1991 ) (holding as harmless error the prosecutor's comments made during closing argu-
ment that defendant's pre-arrest demeanor was inconsistent with her plea of innocent). For a review
of circuit court decisions following Portuondo, see infra note 139.
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pansive interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, while the second set of
cases take a more narrow view.
A. Expanding the Fifth Amendment: The Griffin Line of Case Law
The Supreme Court established an expansive precedent to interpret-
ing the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment when it decided
Griffin v. California.7 In Griffin, the Court held that the self-
incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment prevented the prosecutor
from commenting on the defendant's failure to take the stand in a state
criminal prosecution. 8 The prosecutor's comments to the jury highlighted
the fact that the defendant had not taken the stand.9 The Court held that
allowing the prosecutor's comments would penalize the defendant's right
to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege to remain silent.1° Moreover,
"[iut cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly."'"I The
Court distinguished that "[w]hat the jury may infer, given no help from
the court, is one thing [but] [w]hat it may infer when the court solem-
nizes the silence of the accused into evidence against him is quite an-
other.'
12
In Brooks v. Tennessee, 3 the Court held unconstitutional a Tennes-
see law that penalized a criminal defendant's silence because it required
him to take the stand first, or not at all. 14 The Tennessee statute required
that all criminal defendants "desiring to testify shall do so before any
other testimony for the defense is heard by the court trying the case. ' ' 5
The Court found the law to be "an impermissible restriction on the de-
fendant's right against self-incrimination ...., Moreover, the Court
stated that "[a]lthough 'it is not inconsistent with the enlightened admini-
stration of criminal justice to require the defendant to weigh such pros
and cons in deciding whether to testify,' . . . the choice itself may pose
serious dangers to the success of an accused's defense."' 7
7. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
8. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615.
9. See id. at 610-11. The prosecutor stated, "[w]hat kind of man is it that would want to have
sex with a woman that beat up if she was beat up at the time he left? He would know that. He would
know how she got down the alley .... These things he has not seen fit to take the stand and deny or
explain." Id.
10. Seeid. at 614.
11. Id.
12. Id. It should also be noted that in the same paragraph of the majority's opinion, the Court
cautioned that comments on a defendant's right to remain silent "does not magnify that inference [of
guilt] into a penalty for asserting a constitutional privilege." Id.
13. 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
14. Brook, 406 U.S. at 610.
15. Id. at 606 (quoting the Tenn. Code Ann. Section 40-2403 (1955)).
16. Id. at 609. See also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (holding that "the Fifth
Amendment guarantees against federal infringement --the right of a person to remain silent unless he
chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty..
17. Id. (quoting McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 215 (1971)).
20001
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In Doyle v. Ohio,18 the Court held that a prosecutor in a state crimi-
nal prosecution could not use the defendants' post-arrest silence for im-
peachment purposes at trial.' 9 The defendants chose to remain silent after
receiving their Miranda rights, but at trial testified a police informant had
framed them. 2° In affirming the convictions, the Court of Appeals, Fifth
District, Tuscarawas County Ohio, held that the evidence of post-arrest
silence was not "substantive evidence of guilt but rather [proper] cross
examination" of the witnesses' credibility.21 The Supreme Court rejected
the State's argument that use of post-arrest silence could be used for im-
22peachment purposes and was therefore proper cross-examination. The
Court stated that "it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of
due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach
an explanation subsequently offered at trial. 23
24In Carter v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court addressed whether de-
nial of a jury instruction was in violation of the self-incrimination clause
of the Fifth Amendment. 2' The Court found the defendant had a right to
request a limiting instruction, which would have explained to the jury
that they were to draw no negative inferences from the fact he was not
26testifying. Placing this case in line with Griffin, Justice Stewart held
that "U]ust as adverse comment on a defendant's silence 'cuts down on
the privilege by making its assertion costly,' the failure to limit the ju-
ror's speculation on the meaning of that silence .... exacts an impermis-
sible toll on the full and free exercise of the privilege. 27
More recently, the Supreme Court extended the Griffin precedent to
21include the sentencing phase of criminal cases. In Mitchell, the defen-
dant entered a guilty plea to four counts of cocaine conspiracy. 29 The
District Court instructed the defendant that by entering the guilty plea
she would be waiving her right to remain silent under the Fifth Amend-
18. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
19. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617.
20. See id. at 611-13.
21. Id. at615.
22. See id. at 616-17. But see Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154-55 (1958) (holding
that if a criminal defendant "takes the stand and testifies in his own defense, his credibility may be
impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other witness, and the breadth of his waiver is
determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination.")
23. Id. at 618.
24. 450 U.S. 288 (1981).
25. Carter, 450 U.S. at 289.
26. See id. at 305. The instruction was to read: "The defendant is not compelled to testify and
the fact that he does not cannot be used as inference of guilt and should not prejudice him in any
way." Id. at 288.
27. Id. at 305 (quoting Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. at 614).
28. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 330 (1999). For a detailed analysis of the
Mitchell decision see generally Leading Cases: I. Constitutional Law-Continued, 113 Harv. L. Rev.
244 (1999).
29. Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 317.
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ment.3° The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.3' Justice
Kennedy, writing for the majority, affirmed the Third Circuit's holding
based on Griffin and Estelle v. Smith.32 The Court held, "[t]he concerns
which mandate the rule against negative inferences at a criminal trial
apply with equal force at sentencing. 33 Furthermore, the Court held that
[tihe rule against adverse inferences is a vital instrument for teaching
that the question in a criminal case is not whether the defendant
committed the acts of which he is accused. The question is whether
the Government has carried its burden to prove its allegations while
respecting the defendant's individual rights.34
B. Limiting the Fifth Amendment: The Jenkins Line of Case Law
The Supreme Court's preference for a narrow interpretation of the
self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment dates back to the 19"1
Century with its decision in Reagan v. United States.35 In Reagan, the
defendant was found guilty of smuggling cattle from Mexico in to
36Texas. The defendant appealed his conviction based on the jury in-
structions.3' The Supreme Court held that "the court [may] call the atten-
tion of the jury to any matters which legitimately affect [the defendant's]
testimony and his credibility. 38 However, the Court cautioned that "[tihe
fact that he is a defendant does not condemn him as unworthy of belief,
but at the same time it creates an interest greater than that of any other
witness, and to that extent affects the question of credibility."39 In rea-
soning and language consistent with his 21' Century contemporaries,
Justice Brewer found that while a jury should not draw negative infer-
ences from a defendant's "deep" personal "interest," it is permissible for
the jury, in determining credibility, to consider those interests.
40
30. Seeid. at 317-18.
31. Id. at 319.
32. Id. at 329. See also Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 463 (1981) (holding that it is a viola-
tion of the defendant's rights under the Fifth Amendment for the state to compel testimony at a
sentencing hearing).
33. Id. at 329.
34. Id. at 330.
35. 157 U.S. 301 (1895).
36. Reagan, 157 U.S. at 302.
37. See id. at 304. The instruction stated, "The law permits the defendant, at his own request,
to testify in his own behalf. The defendant here has availed himself of this privilege. The deep per-
sonal interest which he may have in the result of the suit should be considered by the jury in weigh-
ing his evidence and in determining how far or to what extent, if at all, it is worthy of credit." Id.
38. Id. at 305.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 311. See also Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 494 (1917) (holding
"[wihen [the defendant] took the witness stand in his own behalf he voluntarily relinquished his
privilege of silence, and ought not to be heard to speak alone of those things deemed to be for his
interest and be silent where he or his counsel regarded it for his interest to remain so, without the fair
2000]
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In Fitzpatrick v. United States,4' the Supreme Court upheld the con-
viction of a defendant convicted of murder.42 The conviction was ap-
pealed on grounds that the government was allowed to improperly cross-
examine the defendant at trial. 43 The Court rejected this argument,
pointing to the fact that the defendant had voluntarily taken the stand to
establish his alibi for the time of the murder." The Court held that when
a defendant chooses to take the stand and testify, he waives his Fifth
Amendment right to silence, and a prosecutor can treat him as any other
witness 5 Furthermore, the Court stated, "[w]hile no inference of guilt
can be drawn from his refusal to avail himself of the privilege of testify-
ing, he has no right to set forth to the jury all the facts which tend in his
favor without laying himself open to a cross-examination upon those
facts. '
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Fitzpatrick, and strengthened the
waiver principle, in its holding in Raffel v. United States.47 In Raffel, the
defendant was charged and twice tried for violation of the National Pro-
hibition Act.4 8 At the first trial defendant chose not to testify, and the jury
was unable to reach a verdict. 49 At the second trial, in which a guilty ver-
dict was reached, the defendant elected to take the stand and was ques-
tioned as to why he did not do so at the first trial.50 The question certified
to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was
whether it was a violation of the Fifth Amendment to compel the defen-
dant to testify as to his choice to exercise that constitutional right at his
first trial." The Court held that the defendant's "waiver is not partial;
having once cast aside the cloak of immunity, he may not resume it at
will, whenever cross-examination may be inconvenient or embarrass-
ing." 12 The Court conceded, however, "if the defendant had not taken the
stand on the second trial, evidence that he had claimed the same immu-
nity on the first trial would be probative of no fact in issue, and would be
inadmissible., 53 Yet, the Court made clear that the self-incrimination
clause of the Fifth Amendment is a privilege only for those criminal de-
inference which would naturally spring . .
41, 178 U.S. 304 (1900).





47. 271 U.S. 494 (1926).
48. Raffel, 271 U.S. at 495.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 496.




fendants who chose not to testify in their own behalf, and not for defen-
dants who elect to take the stand.54
In Jenkins v. Anderson,5 the Supreme Court reasserted its narrow
view of the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment, and in
doing so clarified and limited its holding in Griffin.56 In Jenkins, the
Court upheld the manslaughter conviction and sentence of petitioner
Jenkins.57 Jenkins stabbed and killed a man, then turned himself into
authorities two weeks later alleging self-defense.58 Jenkins' appeal was
based on the claim that the prosecutor's comments during closing argu-
ment regarding his pre-arrest silence were a violation of his Fifth
Amendment rights.59 The Court rejected Jenkins' Fifth Amendment
claims, pointing out the distinguishing fact from Griffin was that Jenkins
voluntarily took the stand in his own defense.6 Rather, the Court relied
heavily on its holding in Raffel, that "recognized that the Fifth Amend-
ment is not violated when a defendant who testifies in his own defense is
impeached with prior silence. 61 Moreover, once a defendant has taken
the stand and "cast aside his cloak of silence," the "function of the courts
of justice to ascertain the truth . . prevail in the balance of considera-
tions determining the scope and limits of the privilege against self-
incrimination. 62
Thus, while the debate still continues among many lower court tri-
63bunals, the Jenkins holding clearly limited the Griffin line of case law
to only those circumstances where the defendant chose not to take the
stand. Therefore, it was only a matter of time until the first 2 1 st Century
showdown took place between the Jenkins and Griffin line of case law.
That case is now in the books, and we examine it below.
54. See id. at 499.
55. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
56. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 235.
57. See id. at 241.
58. Id. at 232.
59. See id. at 234. The prosecutor told the jury that Jenkins "'waited two weeks, according
to the testimony--at least two weeks before he did anything about surrendering himself or reporting
[the stabbing] to anybody."' (quoting App. transcript at 43).
60. See id. at 235.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 238 (quoting Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 156 (1958)).
63. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
2000]
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II. PORTUONDO V. AGARD 64
A. Facts and Procedural History
1. State Court
On February 25, 1991, Ray Agard was convicted by a jury in the Su-
preme Court of the State of New York of one count of first-degree sod-
omy and two counts of third degree possession of a weapon.65 The vic-
tim, Nessa Winder and key witness, Breda Keegan, testified that Agard
physically assaulted, raped, and sodomized Winder, and threatened both
women with a handgun.66 Agard admitted to striking Winder, but denied
all other allegations, insisting that he and Winder had engaged in consen-
sual sexual intercourse. 67 What caused this case to make it to the United
States Supreme Court were comments made by the prosecutor during her
summation. Over objections from Agard's counsel, the prosecutor told
the jury:
You know, ladies and gentlemen, unlike all the other witnesses in
this case the defendant has a benefit and the benefit is that he has,
unlike all other witnesses, is he gets to sit here and listen to the testi-
mony of all other witnesses before he testifies .... That gives you a
big advantage, doesn't it. You get to sit here and think what am I
going to say and how am I going to say it?
68
The trial court judge denied Agard's motion for a mistrial, holding
that "'the fact that [Agard] was present and heard all the testimony is
something that may fairly be commented on. That has nothing to do with
his right to remain silent. That he was the last witness in the case as (sic)
a matter of fact.'
69
On appeal to the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, one
of the weapon's possession charges against Agard was dropped, but the
remaining charges were affirmed.7° The appellate court did find that the
trial court erred when it prevented Agard's expert witness from testify-
ing, but held that "the error was harmless in view of the overwhelming
evidence of defendant's guilt. . . ."" As to Agard's constitutional claims
regarding the prosecutor's comments, the appellate court held that such
64. 120 S. Ct. 1119(2000).
65. See Agard v. Portuondo, 117 F.3d 696, 698 (2d Cir. 1997).
66. Portuondo, 120 S. Ct. at 1122.
67. See id.
68. Id.
69. Agard, 117 F.3d at 707 (quoting People v. Agard, 199 A.D.2d 401, 403 (2nd Dept. 1993).
70. See People v. Agard, 199 A.D. 2d 401,402 (2d Dept. 1993).
71. Agard, 199 A.D. at 402.
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contentions were without merit.12 Agard next filed for a leave to appeal
with the Court of Appeals of New York, which was denied by Judge
Ciparick on April 14, 1994."3
2. Federal Court
Agard then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal
district court for the Eastern District of New York.
74
Agard appealed three issues before the Second Circuit, but only the
third issue regarding the comments made by the prosecutor in closing
argument will be addressed below.7" Agard alleged that his constitutional
rights to confront his witnesses and have a fair trial were violated by the
prosecutor's comments made during closing arguments of his trial.76 The
Second Circuit agreed with Agard, and based their decision on the ex-
pansive Griffin line of case law.77 The court held that the Supreme Court
in Griffin "recognized that such [prosecutorial] commentary effectively
penalizes the defendant for exercising his Fifth Amendment rights . . .
,,78 The majority opinion held that it was unconstitutional "for a prose-
cutor to insinuate to the jury for the first time during summation that the
defendant's presence in the courtroom at trial provided him with a
unique opportunity to tailor his testimony. 79
3. Supreme Court Decision
a. Majority Opinion
Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion and held that the prosecu-
tor's comments to the jury that the defendant had the opportunity to
"tailor" his testimony after hearing other witnesses testify was a proper
impeachment of a witness's credibility, and did not violate the defen-
80dant's rights under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
72. Id. at 403.
73. Agard, 117 F.3d at 698.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 702-07. Agard also alleged that his constitutional rights were violated because
the trial court had prevented his counsel from questioning the victim about her prior sexual history
and prohibiting his expert witnesses testimony. See id. The court found no error as to the first issue.
See id. As to the second issue, the court found there was error, but not arising to harmful or constitu-
tional error. See id.
76. See id. at 698.
77. It is worth noting that the majority opinion by the Second Circuit did not feel it necessary
to address the Jenkins line of cases with the exception of a brief mention in footnote 9 at page 710.
78. Agard v. Portuondo, 117 F.3d at 709.
79. Id.
80. Portuondo v. Agard, 120 S. Ct. 1119, 1121-23. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas joined Scalia in his opinion. It should be noted that the defendant
in Portuondo also claimed the prosecutor's comments violated his rights under the Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments. See id. The Court rejected these claims with little comment. See id. Scalia made
it clear that Portuondo boiled down to whether the Court should extend Griffin v. California. See id.
2000]
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The Court began its analysis by distinguishing Portuondo from its
holding in Griffin v. California.8' Foremost, the Court pointed out that in
Griffin the prosecutor was asking the jury to do something they were
prohibited from doing-inferring guilt due to the silence of the defen-
dant.82 The difference in this case, according to the Court, is that "it is
natural and irresistible for a jury, in evaluating the relative credibility of
a defendant who testifies last, to have in mind and weigh in the balance
the fact that he heard the testimony of all those who (sic) proceeded
him. 83
Second, the majority distinguished that the prosecutor's comments
in Griffin were impermissible because of their substantive nature-
"Griffin prohibited comments that suggest a defendant's silence is
[substantive] evidence of guilt." By contrast, the prosecutor's
comments in Portuondo "concerned respondent's credibility as a witness,
and were therefore in accord with our longstanding rule that when a
defendant takes the stand, 'his credibility may be impeached and his
testimony assailed like that of any other witness."'
85
The Court next established that Portuondo was analogous to their
86holding in Jenkins v. Anderson. In Jenkins, the Court held that a prose-
cutor's comments made during closing argument regarding the defen-
dant's silence were permissible for impeachment purposes.87 The issue of
credibility distinguished Portuondo from the respondent's analogy to
88Geders v. United States that allowed a defendant to be "treated differ-
ently from other witnesses." 89 Justice Scalia made clear that "[w]ith re-
spect to issues of credibility, however, no such special treatment has
been accorded." 90
The Court next addressed the issue of "tailoring." Pointing to its
decision in Brooks v. Tennessee,9 ' the Court held that "arguing credibility
to the jury-which would include the prosecutor's comments here-is
the preferred means of counteracting tailoring of the defendant's testi-
For a thorough analysis of why the Sixth Amendment does not apply to Portuondo, see generally
Brett H. McGurk, Article: Prosecutorial Comment on a Defendant's Presence at Trial: Will Griffin
Play in a Sixth Amendment Arena?, 31 UWLA L. Rev. 207, 255 (2000) (concluding that the con-
frontation clause of the Sixth Amendment is not violated by a prosecutor's comments that the defen-
dant is present in the courtroom; and "unlike Griffin, the prosecutor's comments in Agard materially
advanced the fundamental societal interest in the ascertainment of truth at trial.").
81. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
82. Portuondo, 120 S. Ct. at 1124.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1125.
85. Id. (quoting Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154 (1958)).
86. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
87. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 240.
88. 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
89. Portuondo, 120 S. Ct. at 1125. In Geders, the defendant was allowed special treatment as
to a sequestration order. Genders, 425 U.S. at 87.
90. Portuondo, 120 S. Ct. at 1125.
91. 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
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mony. 92 Furthermore, the Court pointed to its decision in Reagan v.
United States93 that allowed the jury to be instructed that the defendant's
"deep personal interest" could be considered-"[1]ike the [prosecutor's]
comments in this case, [Reagan] simply set forth a consideration the jury
was to have in mind when assessing the defendant's credibility .. .
Finally, the Court rejected the dissent's contention that because the
prosecutor's comments came during closing arguments, and not during
cross-examination, they were impermissible. 95 The Court found no "con-
stitutionally significant distinction" because as in Reagan, "the chal-
lenged instruction came at the end of the case, after the defense had
rested, just as the prosecutor's comments did here. 96
b. Concurring Opinion
Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion that Justice Breyer
joined.97 Justice Stevens, while joining in the majority's final conclusion,
found the prosecutor's comments to be demeaning and disrespectful to
the "truth-seeking function of the adversary process. 98 Justice Stevens
found that while the prosecutor's comments survived constitutional scru-
tiny, such comments should be "discouraged rather than validated. 99
c. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Ginsburg dissented from the majority's opinion, arguing in
favor of an expansive interpretation of the Fifth Amendment."' Such a
broad protection of the defendant's rights under the Fifth Amendment is,
according to the dissent, supported by the Court's decisions in Griffin
and Doyle.'0' Justice Ginsburg found no distinction with the Court's de-
cisions in Griffin and Doyle- "[b]oth decisions stem from the principle
that where the exercise of constitutional rights is 'insolubly ambiguous'
as between innocence and guilt, a prosecutor may not unfairly encumber
those rights by urging the jury to construe the ambiguity against the de-
fendant. ' 10 2 Ginsburg rejected the majority's contention that the prose-
cutor's comments were permissible because they were directed at im-
peachment of the defendant's credibility-"[n]or can a jury measure a
defendant's credibility by evaluating the defendant's response to the ac-
cusation, for the [comments are] fired after the defense has submitted its
92. Portuondo, 120 S. Ct. at 1125.
93. 157 U.S. 301, 304 (1895).
94. Portuondo, 120 S. Ct. at 1126.
95. See id. at 1126-27.
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. Id. at 1129.
99. Id.
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case." 0 3 Rather, Justice Ginsburg would "rein in a prosecutor solely in
situations where there is no particular reason to believe that tailoring has
occurred and where the defendant has no opportunity to rebut the accu-
sation."' 4
Furthermore, the dissent found the majority's analysis that distin-
guished Griffin "unconvincing"-"[t]he [substantive] inference involved
in Griffin is at least as 'natural' and 'irresistible' as the inference the
prosecutor in Agard's case invited the jury to draw."'0 5 Moreover, Justice
Ginsburg contended that "[i]t makes little sense to maintain that juries
able to avoid drawing adverse inferences from a defendant's silence
would be unable to avoid thinking that only a defendant's opportunity to




Finally, the dissent rejected the majority's conclusion that the
prosecutor's comments were permissible because they were directed at
impeaching the credibility of the defendant, and not toward inferring
substantive evidence of guilt.I17 Justice Ginsburg argued that such a po-
sition is not, as the majority contended, supported by the Court's deci-
sions in Brooks and Jenkins.'°8 Rather, "Jenkins supports the proposition
that cross-examination is of sufficient value as an aid in finding truth at
trial that prosecutors may sometimes question defendants even about
matters that may touch on their constitutional rights, and Brooks suggests
that cross-examination can expose a defendant who tailors his testi-
mony.,,1°9
III. ANALYSIS
The holding in Portuondo has been applauded by those who advo-
cate a narrow, post-Jenkins view of the Fifth Amendment; and criticized
by those who would prefer an expansive Griffin view of the Fifth
Amendment. Section A takes a closer look at the facts in Portuondo,
showing why it is distinguishable from Griffin; and then identifies the
key similarities between Portuondo and the Jenkins line of cases. Section
B reviews the academic literature on the two views represented by Grif-
fin and Jenkins. Lastly, Section C offers an evidentiary alternative to
resolving Portuondo.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1130.
105. Id. at 1133.
106. Portuondo, 120 S. Ct. at 1133.
107. See id. at 1134.
108. See id. at 1135.
109. Id. (quoting Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 238; Brooks, 406 U.S. at 609-12).
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A. Portuondo: In the Tradition of Griffin or Jenkins?
The Supreme Court's holding in Portuondo correctly placed it
among the line of cases following the narrow view of the Fifth Amend-
ment taken in Jenkins v. Anderson."° A look at the facts reveal why
Portuondo is clearly distinguishable from the more expansive interpreta-
tion found in the Griffin v. California1 ' line of cases.
First, unlike the defendant in Griffin, who elected to exercise his
constitutional right to remain silent,"2 the defendant in Portuondo
elected to take the stand and testify in his own defense." 3 Second, the
defendant in Griffin was penalized for exercising his right to be silent." 14
The prosecutor's comments in Griffin were held to be substantive evi-
dence that encouraged the jury to infer guilt on the silent defendant." 5
The defendant in Portuondo was not penalized for exercising his right to
be silent." 6 This would have been impossible because the defendant in
Portuondo did not exercise his Fifth Amendment right.' 7 Rather, the
defendant took the stand and testified in his own defense." 8 Hence, the
facts of Portuondo are clearly distinguishable from Griffin. Conversely,
the facts are much similar to those in Jenkins.
Like the defendant in Jenkins, the defendant in Portuondo chose to
take the stand and testify." 9 The Court correctly pointed out that in tak-
ing the stand a defendant waives his privilege of immunity afforded him
under the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment.12 Once the
defendant has taken the stand and waived his privilege to remain silent,
he can be treated like any other witness, and the opposing party may at-
tack his credibility.' 2' The Court's holding in Portuondo makes clear that
such a waiver is not only open to attack on cross-examination, but
equally vulnerable to a prosecutor's closing argument comments.
Therefore, the Supreme Court's holding in Portuondo places it
among the Jenkins line of case law, and establishes the restrictive view
of the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause as the preferred
method of interpretation for the 21" Century. There remain, however,
those who would prefer a Griffin revival.
110. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
111. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
112. See id. at 609-10.
113. Portuondo, 120 S. Ct. at 1122.
114. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614.
115. See id. at610.
116. Portuondo, 120 S. Ct. at 1128.
117. Seeid. at 1122.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 235 (discussing why the right to remain silent becomes effec-
tively waived when the defendant takes the stand as was established by its precursor Raffel v. United
States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926)).
121. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 235.
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B. Viewing the Opposing Camps: Jenkins verses Griffin
Some critics have argued that the Fifth Amendment must be viewed
in an expansive role or it will lose its meaning.' 22 Notz contends that the
Fifth Amendment is not limited to trial contexts, but rather "the privilege
may be asserted in any situation where the defendant might make self-
incriminating statements that could be used against her in a future crimi-
nal proceeding.' 23 Furthermore, in her analysis of Griffin, Notz con-
cluded that only "an expansive interpretation of Griffin would prohibit a
prosecutor's use of a defendant's decision to remain silent whenever
such use could penalize the defendant for exercising her constitutional
right."' 24 While advocating an expansive Griffin view of the Fifth
Amendment, Notz admits that the recent Supreme Court's treatment of
the "penalty doctrine"'
' 25 in Griffin is on "shaky ground."'
126
One of the most recent academic supporters of a Griffin revival al-
leges that the Supreme Court's decision in Portuondo takes the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination "a step backward.' '127 In
support of his position, Douthat makes three arguments.
First, Douthat accuses the Portuondo Court of not providing reasons
for why a prosecutor "should" be permitted to impeach a defendant's
credibility once they have taken the stand. 28 Yet, in the same breath, he
admits that the Court provided reasons why a prosecutor "can" make
comments for impeachment purposes. 12 9 Thus, Douthat's argument is
nothing more than an argument about semantics. Douthat's reference to
whether a prosecutor should make such comments to a jury is more a
question of prosecutorial misconduct. Misconduct was not at issue in
122. Jane E. Notz, Prearrest Silence as Evidence of Guilt: What You Don't Say Shouldn't Be
Used Against You, 64 U. CHi. L. REV. 1009, 1013 (1997). See also Martin D. Litt, Commentary by
Co-Defendant's Counsel on Defendant's Refusal to Testify: A Violation of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination?, 89 MicH. L. REV. 1008, 1037 (1991) (concluding that the Fifth Amendment
should prohibit any and all comments regarding a criminal defendant's decision to take the stand or
remain silent).
123. Notz, supra note 122, at 1013.
124. Id. at 1014-1015.
125. See Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 99 SuP. CT. REV. 145,
146-47 (1977) (coining the phrase "penalty doctrine" and at the same time predicting its demise).
126. Notz, supra note 122, at 1016.
127. J. Fielding Douthat, Jr., Commentaries on Mark Tushnet's Taking the Constitution Away
From the Courts: Casenote: A Right to Confrontation or Insinuation? The Supreme Court's Holding
in Portuondo v. Agard, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 591, 619 (2000).
128. See id. at 618 (quoting from footnote 4 of Portuondo: "Our decision ... is addressed to
whether the comment is permissible as a constitutional matter, and not to whether it is always desir-
able as a matter of sound trial practice.").
129. Id. It should be noted that Douthat does not complete the quote of footnote 4 in Portuondo.
The last sentence of that footnote answers his question as to why the Supreme Court did not address
the "sound trial practice" of a prosecutor's comments. "[T]he desirability of putting prosecutorial
comment into proper perspective by judicial instruction, are best left to trial courts, and to the ap-
pellate courts which routinely review their work." Portuondo, 120 U.S. at 1127 n.4.
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Portuondo.3 ° The question in Portuondo was whether the rights of the
defendant were burdened or penalized by the prosecutor's comments.
Second, Douthat ridicules the majority in Portuondo for basing its
holding largely on a one hundred-year-old precedent, Reagan v. United
States.'13 Yet, Douthat provides no other basis for this criticism other
than the fact that Reagan is old. In fact, Reagan is actually a one hundred
and five year old precedent that is still law. The fact that Reagan is still
applicable in the 21s" Century is evidence for, not against, its reliance by
the Portuondo Court. 1
32
The third argument raised by Douthat is that the holding in Por-
tuondo now allows a government prosecutor, without proof, to accuse the
defendant of lying. 33 This argument is simply a misstatement of the
opinion. Justice Scalia made it clear that Griffin was not being overruled,
but only limited when he stated:
It is one thing (as Griffin requires) for the jury to evaluate all the
other evidence in the case without giving any effect to the defen-
dant's refusal to testify; it is something else (and quite impossible)
for the jury to evaluate the credibility of the defendant's testimony
while blotting out from its mind the fact that before giving the testi-
mony the defendant had been sitting there listening to other wit-
nesses. Thus, the principle respondent asks us to adopt here differs
from what we adopted in Griffin in one or the other of the following
respects: It either prohibits inviting the jury to do what the jury is
perfectly entitled to do; or it requires the jury to do what is practically
impossible. 134
Professor Snyder has confirmed that the Supreme Court's decision in
Jenkins v. Anderson reaffirmed the waiver analysis used fifty-four years
earlier in Raffel v. United States.35 Snyder points out the critical fact
linking Jenkins and Raffel is that in both cases the defendant took the
130. For a detailed analysis on prosecutorial misconduct, see generally Tara J. Tobin, Note:
Miscarriage of Justice During Closing Arguments By An Overzealous Prosecutor and a Timid Su-
preme Court in State v. Smith, 45 S.D. L. Rev. 186, 189 (2000) (advocating the need for stricter
rules governing closing arguments because of an increase in the "win at all cost" mentality among
prosecutors); Rosemary Nidiry, Note: Restraining Adversarial Excess in Closing Argument, 96
Colum. L. Rev. 1299, 1334 (1996) (concluding that trial judges should be given more discretion to
limit misconduct of both prosecutors and defense attorneys during closing arguments to the jury);
James W. Gunson, Comment: Prosecutorial Summation: Where is the Line Between "Personal
Opinion" and Proper Argument?, 46 Me. L. Rev. 241, 282 (1994) (suggesting that only prosecutorial
misconduct that is truly egregious should lead to a court overturning a defendant's conviction or
sanctioning of a prosecutor).
131. Douthat supra note 127, at 618.
132. See supra discussion Parts I.B.
133. Douthat, supra note 127, at 618.
134. Portuondo, 120 U.S. at 1124.
135. Barbara R. Snyder, A Due Process Analysis of the Impeachment Use of Silence in Crimi-
nal Trials, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 285, 288 (1988).
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stand and thus waived his privilege of remaining silent. 3 6 Moreover, the
Jenkins' Court reaffirmed that "[in determining whether a constitutional
right has been burdened impermissibly, it is also appropriate to consider
the legitimacy of the challenged governmental practice."'3 7 As in Raffel
and Jenkins, the defendant in Portuondo waived his Fifth Amendment
right to immunity by taking the stand to testify. Thus, Professor Snyder's
analysis was a correct forecast of the Supreme Court's decision in Por-
tuondo.
If the supporters for a Griffin revival felt they were on "shaky
ground"'138 prior to the Court's holding in Portuondo, it is now becoming
apparent that Griffin's precedent is quickly losing ground. 39
C. Seeking a Different Approach: An Evidentiary Analysis of Portuondo
Although the Supreme Court's holding in Portuondo relied on the
constitutional precedents established by Jenkins and Raffel, there is sup-
port for the theory that such cases could be resolved on purely eviden-
tiary grounds. 140 The Portuondo Court focused much of its opinion on the
fact that the defendant, by taking the stand, effectively waived his privi-
136. Snyder, supra note 135, at 288-289.
137. Id. at 289 (quoting Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980)).
138. See Notz, supra at Part IV.B.
139. The following courts have made post-Portuondo rulings: Soering v. Deeds, 2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS 15443, at *13-14 (4th Cir. June 30, 2000) (holding that even if the lower court wanted
to extend Griffin, the Supreme Court's decision in Portuondo permitted the prosecutor's comments
regarding the defendant's refusal to consent to searches); United States v. Ducott, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 4680, at *3 (8th Cir. March 24, 2000) (holding that the prosecutor's comments at closing
argument that the defendant had lied were proper in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Portuondo); United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 22941, at *23-24 (9th Cir.
Sept. 13, 2000) (holding that the government's references to the defendant's defense as a "sham"
were proper impeachment of the defendant's testimony under the Supreme Court's holding in Por-
tuondo); United States v. Pemberton, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 15814, at *16-17 (10th Cir. July 7,
2000) (holding that the prosecutor's comments during closing argument that the defendant had heard
every witness in the case and therefore had the opportunity to tailor his testimony were permissible
in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Portuondo); United States v. Johnson, 212 F.3d 1313,
1315 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that the prosecutor's comments to the jury that the defendant had the
opportunity to tailor his testimony were not improper under the Fifth Amendment following the
Supreme Court decision in Portuondo); United States v. Jenkins, 2000 CAAF LEXIS 948, at *35
(C.A.A.F. Aug. 31, 2000) (holding that the defendant's rights were not violated under the Fifth
Amendment per the Supreme Court's holding in Portuondo) (Crawford, J., concurring); State v.
Alexander, 755,A.2d 868, 872 (Conn. 2000) (holding that the prosecutor's comments during closing
arguments that the defendant had the ability to tailor his testimony was not unconstitutional based on
the Portuondo decision); State v. Marshall, 4 P.3d 1039, 1044 n.l (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that
based on Portuondo, a prosecutor is allowed to point out the fact that a defendant has not presented
evidence to support his theory). For a recent analysis advocating the Jenkins line of case law over
Griffin, see generally Stefanie Petrucci, Comment: The Sound of Silence: The Constitutionality of
the Prosecution's Use of Prearrest Silence in Its Case-in-Chief, 33 U.C. DAViS L. REV. 449, 452
(2000) (concluding that it is constitutional for a prosecutor to use evidence of a defendant's prearrest
silence in her case-in-chief).
140. See generally Snyder, supra at note 135, at 293-301 (providing a detailed evidentiary
analysis).
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lege to remain silent, and opened himself to impeachment. Moreover,
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, insisted that the issue at trial in
Portuondo "ultimately came down to a credibility determination."' 4' Yet,
there have been two significant cases where the Supreme Court rejected
the Raffel and Jenkins waiver test and instead based their holdings on
evidentiary principles.
142
1. Application of Grunewald v. United States
143
In Grunewald, the Court found that it was impermissible for the trial
court to permit cross-examination of the defendant's choice to exercise
his privilege to remain silent at an earlier grand jury appearance.' 44 In
rejecting the lower court's use of Raffel, the Court held that "[Raffel]
does not, however, solve the question whether in the particular circum-
stances of this case the cross-examination should have been excluded
because its probative value on the issue of the [defendant's] credibility
was so negligible as to be far outweighed by its possible impermissible
impact on the jury.' ' 145 Thus, in reaching its holding in Grunewald, the
Court essentially applied an evidentiary analysis now codified in the
Federal Rules of Evidence.' 46 Indeed, the Court acknowledged this fact
when it stated, "[w]e are not unmindful that the question whether a prior
statement is sufficiently inconsistent to be allowed to go to the jury on
the question of credibility is usually within the discretion of the trial
judge.' 47
2. Application of United States v. Hale
48
In Hale, the Court held that it was impermissible "prejudicial error
for the trial court to permit cross-examination of respondent concerning
his silence .. . . 149Again, the Court rejected the reference to Raffel, dis-
agreeing with the government's position that the defendant's silence was
"similarly probative and should therefore be admissible for impeachment
141. Portuondo, 120 S. Ct. at 1122.
142. See infra Parts I and 2.
143. 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
144. Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 424.
145. Id. at 420.
146. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice .... Fed. R. Evid. 403. For a recent review of the
case law utilizing Rule 403, see generally Steven J. Halasz, Annotation, Propriety Under Rule 403 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, Permitting Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice,
Confusion, or Waste of Time, of Attack on Credibility of Witness For Party, 48 A.L.R. Fed. 390,
392 (1980) (explaining that prior to the adoption of the balancing test under Rule 403, the courts
utilized what was known as "collateral impeachment").
147. Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 423-24 (the Court went on to add, "[blut where such evidentiary
matter has grave constitutional overtones, as it does here, we feel justified in exercising this Court's
supervisory control to pass on such a question.").
148. 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
149. Hale, 422 U.S. at 181.
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purposes."' ' ' ° The Court held that "the probative value [of]... silence in
this case was outweighed by the prejudicial impact of admitting it into
evidence." '' Furthermore, in deciding Hale on evidentiary principles,
the Court admitted, "we have no occasion to reach the broader constitu-
tional question that supplied an alternative basis for the [lower court's]
decision below.'
52
Professor Snyder explains that the Supreme Court's holdings in
Grunewald and Hale both reasoned that "the probative value of the evi-
dence of silence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect."'' 53 However,
Professor Snyder rejects the Court evidentiary analysis, calling it "a con-
stitutional analysis in disguise."' 5 4 In support of this criticism, Snyder
cites to the Court's holding in Griffin v. California.'55 Given the Court's
holding in Portuondo, which severely limits the Griffin precedent, Sny-
der's comment is turned on its head.
In Portuondo, the probative value of the prosecutor's comments
(reminding the jury that the defendant had an opportunity to tailor his
testimony) was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect (penalizing or
burdening the defendant's right to exercise his right to silence). This is
further supported by two additional facts in Portuondo. First, there was a
proper limiting instruction given to the jury. 156 Second, the defendant
chose to take the stand and testify in his own defense, which effectively
waived his Fifth Amendment privilege. Moreover, it took the Griffin
penalty test out of play because now the prosecutor's comments are not
substantive in nature. Rather, the prosecutor's comments are merely
pointing out a procedural rule of evidence-that the defendant took the
stand last. Thus, the holdings in Grunewald and Hale provide an eviden-
tiary alternative to the Court's ruling in Portuondo.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Portuondo was correctly decided
following the strict interpretation of the self-incrimination clause of the
Fifth Amendment. The defendant in Portuondo voluntarily chose to take
the stand and testify in his own defense. In doing so, the defendant ef-
fectively waived the immunity afforded him under the Fifth Amendment.
150. Id. at 175.
151. Id. at 173.
152. Id.
153. Snyder, supra note 135, at 300.
154. Id. at 301.
155. Id. at 301 n.93 (concluding that the Supreme Court's holding in Griffin rejected, on Fifth
Amendment constitutional grounds, California's evidentiary rule that would have allowed the jury to
consider the fact that Griffin had failed to testify).
156. See Portuondo, 120 S.Ct. at 1127 (quoting from transcript at 834 ("A defendant is of
course an interested witness since he is interested in the outcome of the trial. You may as jurors wish




Moreover, the defendant's right to exercise his silence was never bur-
dened, nor in any manner penalized. Once the defendant in Portuondo
elected to take the stand, he opened the door for the prosecutor to im-
peach his credibility. The Court correctly established that there is no dis-
tinction between the prosecutor electing to impeach the defendant on
cross-examination, or waiting until closing argument.
Furthermore, Portuondo is clearly distinguishable from the Court's
more expansive holdings in the Griffin line of case law. In Griffin, the
prosecutor's comments were impermissible because they encouraged the
jury to infer guilt based on the defendant's decision to remain silent. The
Court correctly held that such substantive inference was an impermissi-
ble burden that penalized the defendant for exercising his constitutional
right. In Portuondo, the prosecutor's comments were not substantive in
nature. Rather, the comments sought to remind the jury what the instruc-
tion had already pointed out-that they could consider the fact that the
defendant testified last. Because the defendant had waived his right to
silence by taking the stand, the prosecutor's comments were permissible
for impeachment of credibility; and, in no manner burdened or penalized
the defendant. Therefore, the Supreme Court's decision in Portuondo
was correctly decided following the more narrow interpretation of the
self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment.
John Owens
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